

---

# Discrediting Suicide Bombing: An Information Strategy

By Mary E. Whisenhunt

**Editorial Abstract:** *The author provides a detailed overview of a multiagency political-social exchange which brought together representatives from across the Middle East and North America to address the problems of suicide bombing. Attendees examined and outlined both conventional and unconventional approaches to countering this extremist tactic.*

## 1.0 Background

US Central Command requested that the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command plan and host, through the JIOWC's Virtual Integrated Support for the IO eNvironment (VISION) process, a seminar to develop an information strategy to discredit suicide bombing in the Middle East. US Special Operations Command joined USCENTCOM in combined sponsorship of the forum. The University of Texas-San Antonio (UTSA) served as joint hosts with the JIOWC, at the Institute of Texan Cultures.

This event followed a March 2007 seminar hosted by USCENTCOM in which dozens of information activities (IAs) aimed at discrediting suicide bombings (SBs) were developed. The August forum in San Antonio had three related goals:

- Provide additional detail and depth to IAs identified in March 2007
- Identify "owners" of specific IA-related actions within the interagency community
- Develop new IAs on discrediting SB through 1) ideological means, 2) re-branding and 3) the media and the Internet, to include blogging

The seminar brought together a diverse community of interest (COI) from industry, foreign media, marketing, information technology, academia, research institutions, the clergy, entertainment, DOD, the interagency, and the intelligence community. More than 100 persons participated in the collaborative drafting of an informational strategy that should add lasting value to USCENTCOM and USSOCOM efforts to counter violent extremism.

Participants identified and discussed the ways and means in crafting a coherent

discrediting strategy, as well as US and adversary strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. The group also identified informational requirements and shortfalls. Finally, three breakout groups crafted IAs focused on discrediting SB using ideological, media, and marketing schemes. Presentations focused on ongoing USG efforts that could or should be synchronized with IAs developed in the course of the seminar.

In addition to the CENTCOM goals articulated above, the seminar will also serve as a jumping off point for follow-on information operations planning under VISION. Seminar participants are intended to serve as the COI to support that planning. IAs will be cross-walked with ongoing initiatives elsewhere in DOD and the interagency community, and incorporated into a discrediting suicide bombing information campaign.

## 2.0 Key Findings

An extraordinary team of experts and stakeholders participated in the "Discrediting Suicide Bombing: An Information Strategy" seminar. Their comments and observations provided unique insights into both ongoing strategic communication (SC) initiatives directed against violent extremism, and future efforts as well. Of particular note were proposed actions associated with rebranding, or repositioning, suicide bombing in the Middle East, and discrediting suicide bombing through the blogosphere. A common theme throughout all panels and speakers was that the strategy must include actions directed at altering the suicide bomber narrative, and the arguments justifying the attacks.

Taking a marketing view of the discrediting SB information campaign leads us down a distinct path in terms of

audience identification. Branding and reposition should focus on the "easy" targets: soft and hard supporters of moderation and non-violence. Preaching to the converted, and facilitating their access to multiple communication paths, will encourage moderate voices to speak up, gain momentum, and spread virally through word-of-mouth and media, including the Internet. Do not expend effort on the hard opposition, or focus on isolating them within the Muslim community and leave the soft opposition alone so as to not further inflame them or stiffen their resolve.

A trend that emerged throughout the discussions was whether messaging should focus on the religious and ideological aspect of suicide bombing, solely on the criminal aspect, or whether a combination of those aspects. Though contested, the consensus appeared to be that a combination of the two would be most effective. On the religious, and to a great extent ideological side, regionally-based clerics, academics, and activists would resonate most strongly with a Middle East audience, while the USG would more appropriately focus on the criminal aspects of both the actors and tactics. Portraying suicide bombers as criminals or thugs, and their actions as criminal in nature, vice as part of jihad, are necessary elements of the campaign. For example, US use of the phrase "Global War on Terror" inadvertently empowers these criminals to depict themselves as "warriors." Focusing on the human rights violation aspect of the attacks, particularly against attacks involving children as either suicide bombers or victims, may achieve greater traction in the international law arena or within the United Nations (UN).

Facilitating moderate voice access to multiple communications ways and

means is a key enabler in creating pro-moderation, pro-democracy activists. Our experts on the Blogosphere Panel suggested that the more the virtual network expands to reach these potential voices, the more the effort on the ground gains momentum, and the more effective bloggers become in countering extremism and supporting an open Middle Eastern information environment. Thus, IAs focused on creating a largely free Internet access point in the region, combined with blogging initiatives, became a pivot point in the discrediting SB strategy.

As often happens in US government (USG) forums centered on developing “hearts and minds” strategies, the “elephant in the room” was US foreign policy and its impact on openly USG-sponsored SC and information operation initiatives. This factor becomes particularly relevant when, as one of our marketing panelists posited, one considers that nothing kills a bad product more quickly than a great advertisement. Translated to operational terms, if our target audience perceives a significant disconnect between US geopolitical actions, and the messages we’re exporting in public diplomacy or SC realms, our ability to achieve objectives could be significantly damaged. Our already shaky credibility further declines, and USG sponsorship of any endeavor becomes a liability.

The role of third party validators (3PVs), or credible voices which can carry messages discrediting suicide bombing and violent extremism as a whole, then becomes paramount. The majority of the information activities generated by the seminar group require at least some level of 3PV involvement or sponsorship.

Knowledge harvesting focused on a few key areas, including threats and opportunities vis-à-vis the discrediting SB campaign, and information shortfalls in our understanding of suicide bombers and their tactics. US strengths were heavily focused on ideological and societal factors, particularly on American freedoms and values (of particular interest, our kinetic powers received minor attention in this exercise). One

could postulate that USG-sponsored messages amplifying those values and freedoms would resonate most strongly.

Threats to the US focused on geopolitical factors. Opportunities identified were all over the map, but centered heavily on developmental, economic, and exchange initiatives which could lay the groundwork for improved international relationships at all levels, and a more inhospitable environment for terrorists.

### 3.0 Methodology

VISION seminars are a critical first step in the planning process, both in building a topical community of interest and in crafting an effective, synchronized plan that meets strategic objectives. This VISION planning process serves as the seminar’s analytical backbone.

The interdependence of information activities associated with countering violent extremism, to include discrediting suicide bombing, calls for an unprecedented level of collaboration among USG agencies as well as partner nations, industry, and the media. USG planning parameters sometimes lead to a planning framework that can impede collaboration with experts who are not part of DOD or the interagency community. As such, it is critical to develop a robust and diverse COI for brainstorming, data solicitation, and cross-pollination of ideas.

Knowledge-harvesting exchanges provided an opportunity to rapidly extract topic-specific data from participants in identifying strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats and ultimately in building a common frame of reference in building a successful strategy.

The seminar was intended to accomplish the following:

- Establish a COI relevant to the planning problem and identify the unique expertise each subject matter expert (SME) can contribute.
- Promote greater understanding and cooperation among COI members to facilitate future interactions.
- Provide a forum for further refining the IAs from the earlier CENTCOM seminar, identify “owners” of associated

actions, and develop consensus on an information strategy.

- Enhance and expand the VISION SME database to be used in supporting future planning efforts associated with the topic.

### 4.0 Seminar Attendance

Ideally, a strategy seminar ranges from 10 to 50 participants, depending on the planning activity. For this seminar, more than 80 persons participated in the first two days of the forum; approximately 20 additional persons joined the group on the last two days. While not optimally sized, the level of interest dictated a larger forum.

JIOWC drew participants from multiple communities including: USAID; Voice of America; industry, to include advertising, publishing, entertainment and virtual social network experts; Pan-Arab and Afghan media representatives; bloggers; researchers; intelligence analysts; academia; foreign diplomatic and military representatives; the DOD, Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Justice, and the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee. These invitees helped generate approaches to discrediting SB activities that might not otherwise have been identified in a USG-only planning environment.

### 5.0 Subject Matter Expert Presentations

Representatives from the Government of Iraq, the USG interagency community, academia, research institutions and industry briefed on the suicide bombing phenomenon and recommendations to discredit it. The presentations established a foundation to draft IAs. Highlights from each are presented below for the various efforts.

**5.1 Opening Comments** (HE Ambassador Samir Al-Sumaida’ie, Iraqi Ambassador to the US)

- The phenomenon of suicide bombing (SB) has long been of interest to him, but particularly now since it is tearing his country apart; discussed the magnitude of the psychological, emotional, economic and security impact

of SB on Iraq; literally a matter of life and death for his country. They must have the support of the world at large to discredit.

- Discrediting SB is not enough; we must get to the root of the problem. We must focus on a strategic approach: a supply and demand challenge that must be attacked from both sides.

- Extremists rely on cultural, social and political conditioning to recruit and convert bombers, most of whom would never have considered killing themselves prior to this “conversion.” Their brand of Islam is totalitarian in nature: all must conform or be eliminated.

- SB is made possible by effective packaging that appeals to young people, including the false notion that suicide bombers are pleasing to Allah and making their friends and family proud.

- It is not enough to have religious leaders condemn SB. We must reach the point where any Imam who condones SB is stripped of their title. Anyone who condones suicide bombing is guilty of incubating this environment, including media networks such as Al Jazeera. There should be a new legal framework that prevents the media from being used as a mouthpiece for terrorist propaganda.

- We need a multi-lateral approach that includes the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations, which includes the enactment of a “non-suicide bombing” treaty similar to today’s non-proliferation treaties.

**5.2 Keynote Speech** (Paul Hanley, Director of Strategic Communication, Joint Chiefs of Staff)

- The US must involve not only our partner nations as we craft a cohesive global strategic communication (SC) strategy to combat terrorism, but also countries and organizations which are not normally our allies.

- Discrediting suicide bombing may be considered a “test tube” initiative for the overall SC strategy against violent extremism.

- Suicide bombings and other acts of violent extremism will only end when mothers decide they love their children more than they hate each other.

- Discussion: Calling the war a “global war on terror (GWOT)” empowers thugs and criminals to call themselves “warriors.”

**5.3 The Suicide Bomber and Supporter Identities: Who is Our Audience?** (Dr. Walid Phares, Foundation for the Defense of Democracies)

- One of the strengths of ideologues behind suicide bombers has been the cadre of Western intellectuals who say SB is a legitimate tactic against colonialism and oppression, creating the sense that the world supports the use of this tactic, not just the Muslim nation. Resistance and martyrdom are two of the few ideological bases for SB.

- We have not reached a full consensus as to how to define the suicide bomber. Neither terrorists nor jihadists are “suicidal” in the terms we would consider it. The most recent research into the socio-economic background of jihadis showed that the entire strata are represented. If you ask the jihadi, he himself would say SB is not part of his agenda.

- Changing the lexicon of SB is important, but we need to wage it in the right battlefield. The US can’t do it—the Imams must do it. The clerics must explain why we cannot have religious wars in our day.

- We must develop a long-term strategy which focuses on the young from the ages of 0-14. Money spent on education in the Arab world would help engage that younger generation. We must change school curricula. Civil society resistance is required, to include blogging and non-governmental organization (NGO) activities. We should identify 100 Arab speakers who can debate issues on Pan-Arab television.

- Theologically, we must engage sensitively. We need real Imams and real debate to counter theological arguments. We should spend less on physical weapons and more on de-radicalization programs. One billion dollars to de-radicalize would do so much more than any F-16s we could purchase.

**5.4 US Agency International Development (USAID) Activities** (Dr. Stephen Gale, Senior Advisor, Legislative and Public Affairs, USAID)

- Many USAID activities are tangentially related to US efforts to counter violent extremism.

- USAID builds schools, employs youth, and provides jobs, micro-loans, power generators, and electricity.

- While poverty is not considered “the” determinant factor in the recruitment of suicide bombers, developmental assistance from the US provides visible proof of American compassion. If the US helps to improve a family’s quality of life, it makes it difficult for extremists to claim that our nation doesn’t care.

## 6.0 Panel Presentations And Discussion

A number of themes emerged during the course of the panel presentations on recommendations to discredit SB, and in the group and sidebar discussions that followed them:

**6.1 Suicide Bomber Phenomenon** (Frank Cilluffo, George Washington University [see also *IO Sphere Summer 2007*, page 14]; and Michael Soussan, New York University)

- Frank Cilluffo: Suicide bombing is an effective tactic and is a phenomenon that is largely based in story-telling, and the narrative. Mythology has been wrapped into fact, then into distorted religion, along the way.

- There is only so much that the US itself can accomplish in changing that narrative. Only a leader from that constituency has the credibility to accomplish anything substantive. We need to hear from former radicals like Hassan Butt, who has stated in the press that he recruited others into joining a terrorist network.

- Successful efforts in the international realm include the Saudi “Tranquility Program.” Yemen also has a successful rehabilitation program in which they use religious scholars to counter the terrorists’ ideology, pulling the religious justification out of the argument.

- We need to isolate the Al Qaida leadership from the rest of the organization, and the organization from societies at large. From an informational perspective, we need to remind the world that the majority of SB victims have been Muslim. We should remind others about the hundreds of kids who were killed in Beslan, show simple videos, show bombings in Jordan, and in Casablanca. In the end, this is not about public relations—our message sells itself without our pushing it.

- Michael Soussan: The media cannot be neutral in this fight. Outlets often give equal time to both “sides” after a suicide bombing, often focusing on the reaction to the attack. In some ways that actually legitimizes the terrorist actions. For example, after the US assault on Fallujah in 2004, the UN Secretary General’s statements referred only to the assault itself, rather than to the earlier use of Fallujah as a terrorist base of operations.

- If you represent the UN you must choose sides: the side that fights terrorism.

- We must challenge the culture of certain international organizations vis-à-vis terrorism. We can’t let them get away with creating moral confusion where there must be moral clarity.

- Discussion: Any internationally-accepted definition of terrorism would have to focus on indisputable assertions: “No one should be allowed to target civilians for political purposes.”

- Efforts to engage from a moderate theological perspective are complicated by US conservative talk radio, which sends indirect messages attacking Islam.

- The ability of US Muslims to get the moderate word out is dependent on and requires assistance from the US political system and media outlets; moderate points of view simply don’t get the air time that extreme views do.

**6.2 Regional Media Policy and Suicide Bombing** (Samir Khader, *Al Jazeera* and Nadia Charters, *Al Arabiya*)

- Samir Khader: Much of the US’ counter-violent extremism SC efforts in the Middle East are ineffective due to its lack of understanding of regional culture.

- SB is an effective weapon that “injures the dignity of the enemy”

- In the Middle East, descriptive phrases “martyr” and “martyrdom” used rather than “suicide bombing.” Its debatable whether SB is actually martyrdom. The term “secularist” is an insult in the Middle East.

- Suicide bombing is not on the decline in the Middle East; rather, the next generation is already postured to become terrorists. There seems to be no alternative for many university students, who are not allowed to engage in open debate and whose campuses are



*What actions may discourage future extremism?*  
(Defense Link)

surrounded by police. Such restraints on freedom make it easy for Islamists to recruit.

- Discussion: *Al Jazeera* considers itself “objective” in its reporting of suicide bombings and “doesn’t take sides.” *Al Jazeera* is “not CNN” and targets the “grassroots of Arab culture”; their programming is representative of that focus. It is not the responsibility of *Al Jazeera* to show only the moderate and responsible side in its coverage of terrorist activity, including suicide bombings.

- Nadia Charters: The Arab media plays a large role in informing or misinforming the public, and the Arab world uses television as a source of

that information. *Al Arabiya* wants to provide an alternative to *Al Jazeera*—a more objective, less sensationalist alternative.

- We cannot ban voices, even pro-terrorism voices, within the media. The last thing we want to see is censorship. However, news reporting should have ethics and standards.

- *Al Arabiya* guidelines in reporting on suicide bombers include a focus on the victims, rather than the perpetrators. *Al Arabiya* was, in fact, the first regional outlet to use the term “suicide bombers” rather than “martyrs.” The network does not air any material that directly or indirectly promotes suicide bombing. We have interviewed clerics who denounce attacks, as well as victims of suicide attacks in Iraq.

- Discussion: Censorship was one of the prominent topics discussed during the question and answer period following Ms Charters’ presentation. One participant argued that *Hamis TV*’s programming brainwashed Palestinian children into violent extremism and suicide bombing. Ms Charters responded that while shutting down children’s shows in this case was well worth debating, censorship was still a thin line that should be watched. Others opined that “freedom of speech” did not include teaching children to kill themselves. Ambassador Al-Sumaida’ie recommended that we develop international standards that “deny the oxygen of publicity to terrorists,” making it illegal to broadcast messages that threaten the lives of innocent people. Determining a legal basis for doing so is the challenge.

**6.3 Discrediting Suicide Bombing in the Blogosphere** (Ammar Abdulhamid, *Thawra Community Blog*; and Tony Badran, *Foundation for Defense of Democracies Blog*)

- Ammar Abdulhamid: Working at the grassroots level is critical in Middle East modernization and democratization effort, as many communities and regions don’t trust each other.

- The Internet is key to build networks of activists, generate ideas,

and raise public awareness; objective is to build virtual networks that parallel activist networks on the street.

- Found that the more the virtual network expands, the more the effort on the ground builds steam. Internet and blogging are key to effectiveness in activist David vs. Goliath match.

- Discrediting SB recommendations: create online group of activists, start “task force,” discuss the issue on-line, invite Imams and others into the group. Huge events are unnecessary—local efforts more effective. Activists on the ground will have more practical ideas than those generated by this seminar. Focus groups key to identify issues most important to various segments of population.

- Social networks, blogs, very effective tools that enable brainstorming and turn bloggers into activists.

- The more access activists have to the Internet, the more effective they can be in countering extremism and supporting modernization and democratization. Using satellites to make the Internet free and available everywhere in the region, so that anyone with satellite television could also have access to the Internet, would be extremely effective.

- Tony Badran: In an informational campaign, we need an Arab media strategy, not just a counter-Al Qaida strategy. We must rather understand what messages already resonate with the audience. Central theme in Arab media is a narrative of perpetual Western aggression, loss of Muslim life, and conspiracy theories. These narratives strengthen the theme of humiliation and the need for “resistance.”

- Recommendations: DOD Public Affairs must develop trained Arabic-speaking press officers and develop viable material that speaks to the concerns and ideology of the Arab media. We must also empower Arab voices, through developing, cultivating and empowering third party validators. We must also use only truthful material in the informational strategy.

- Discussion: The question of blogging and anonymity emerged during the question and answer period. Mr

Abdulhamid said that the blogging groups assumed that they would be penetrated and planned accordingly. He added that they actually wanted there to be some penetration so as to be considered less threatening to the regimes.

- Most blogging occurs in English; while computer software permits the use of Arabic to an extent, modifications are needed.

**6.4 Suicide Bomber Ideology** (Brooke Goldstein, Esq., A2B Film Productions [See interview, page 12]; and Imam Mohamad Bashar Arafat, Civilizations Exchange and Cooperation Foundation).

- Imam Arafat: asserted that discrediting suicide bombing was a two-way street, and that a convergence of Muslim leadership and US foreign policy is needed. Neither can accomplish it alone and both have things for which to apologize.

- Religion and politics are both necessary mechanisms that must be used to halt suicide bombing. Religion cannot do it alone, nor can politics, but neither should be considered an excuse for inaction.

- Recommendation: On domestic level, American politicians should reach out to Muslim communities in their home towns.

- There is a great need for trained Imams, particularly those who have an understanding of foreign languages and culture. Imams’ training should include an understanding of the US.

- American values are also Islamic values, including freedom of the press, religion and economy.

**6.5 Suicide Bombing Branding Campaign** (Scott Miller, Core Strategy Group [See article, page 16]; and Matthew Williams, Martin Agency)

- Matt Williams: Lessons learned from branding campaigns can provide insights into effort to discredit SB. A great brand is about creating meaning, but nothing will kill a bad product more quickly than a great ad. In other words, actions and words must coalesce in the strategy (inference was that US foreign

policy/ development assistance etc must complement discrediting SB strategy).

- All branding is local

- An analogous effort was the “Truth” anti-smoking campaign, in which negative feelings were attached to then-acceptable “cool” behavior. The goal in discrediting SB then should be to change the meaning of suicide bombing as achieving the opposite of the audience’s motivation. We must change the meaning of the SB behavior from:

- A statement of devotion, to an affront to Islam.

- Catalyst for independence to proof of lack of readiness.

- Path to “hero” status to a sign of “misguided extremism.”

- Discussion: A theme that emerged during the question and answer period was whether the message should focus on countering religious arguments used to support SB, or on the criminality of the behavior. While no consensus was achieved, a common thought was that the US could address the criminality, but that a non-US 3PV would have to strip away the religious veneer of the SB argument.

- An ancillary piece of the campaign should be repositioning the “death” by SB brand for children, who don’t understand death as anything but paradise.

- Are we inadvertently accepting Al Qaida’s SB branding? Suicide bombing is depicted by the media as being the product of a failed US foreign policy, rather than a villain’s action.

## 7.0 Knowledge Harvesting Findings

Mr. John Rendon, of The Rendon Group, conducted a series of interactive knowledge-based exchanges in which participants provided insight regarding strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for the US in efforts to discredit suicide bombing and violent extremism, as well as deltas in the knowledge base of our understanding of suicide bombers and their tactics. Through this process, the group identified aspects of the phenomenon that enhanced the quality of breakout sessions on day two of the seminar. These exchanges helped

foster group participation, a shared understanding of the problem set, and build the basis for consensus.

## 8.0 Information Activities

Seminar facilitators collectively reviewed the information garnered at the seminar in order to expand on key IAs previously identified in seminars and discussed in breakout sessions. IAs include: goals, issues and obstacles, primary audiences, lines of operation (implementers), key assumptions, assessment methodology, and the way ahead.

Ideology working group participants initiated a debate on whether the West is fighting an ideology, or not. There are multiple schools of thought leaning toward the conclusion that we are not fighting ideology. A second level of debate argues that the issue is not about faith or religion. Some felt that to truly identify proper goals and objectives, follow-on actions must answer a cascade of logical questions to establish the crux of the issues.

IAs tended to “cluster” into several categories:

- Discrediting suicide bombing/attacks as a tactic.
  - Discrediting the ideological basis or religious basis for suicide bombing/attacks.
  - Al Qaida’s or the Taliban’s use of suicide bombing/attacks to kill children and civilians, particularly Muslims.
  - Re-brand extremists: replace image of martyrdom with sense of wasted potential or of being “uncool” [See article, page 16].
  - Empowerment and amplification of moderates through media and Internet.
- Sample IAs follow:

### 8.1 Discrediting Suicide Bombing/Attacks as a Tactic

Develop International Framework to make Suicide Bombing Universally Acknowledged to be Illegal, Immoral and a Violation of Human Rights.

Just as there are non-proliferation treaties, environmental treaties, human rights treaties—the US should work with the UN and other international organizations to develop a treaty and legal

framework whereby suicide bombing is codified as unacceptable worldwide—not only morally but legally. Such a legal framework gives Arab states the justification they need to act. It allows the US to work through an international consolidated effort, instead of through direct pressure on Arab states.

### 8.2 Discrediting the Ideological Basis or Religious Basis for Suicide Bombing/Attacks

- Hold initial conference of moderate Islamic experts in the AOR focused on suicide bombings in Iraq; broadcast on television; amplify in regional, international media. Hold follow-on series of conferences focusing on regional centers.

- Need to host conferences in the virtual world—but be careful of too much emphasis on USG sponsorship.

- Build a strategy based on/with clerics: Interfaith dialogue such as World Council of Religions for Peace (WCRP): largest international coalition of representatives from the world’s great religions dedicated to promoting peace.

- Human rights organizations: UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF); Global Commission for the Preservation of Sacred Sites (GCPSS): founded in conjunction with UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Monument Fund; function of this commission is to engage religious communities in securing sacred sites endangered by conflict and intolerance and restoring those damaged by war.

## 9.0 Summary

Participants identified and discussed the ways and means in crafting a coherent discrediting strategy, as well as friendly and adversary strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. They further identified informational requirements and shortfalls. Breakout groups crafted IAs focused on discrediting SB using ideological, media, and marketing schemas. Presentations focused on ongoing USG efforts that could or should be synchronized with IAs developed in the seminar. Dominant themes that emerged include:

- The strategy must alter the suicide bomber narrative, and the related religious/ideological arguments justifying the attacks.
- Portraying suicide bombers as criminals, or thugs, and their actions as criminal in nature, vice as part of jihad, are necessary campaign elements.
- Focusing on the human rights violation aspect of the attacks, particularly those involving children as either suicide bombers or victims, may achieve greater traction in international law.
- Viewing the discrediting SB challenge through the lens of marketing or advertising greatly enhanced the development of innovative options to counter it.
- Overt US involvement can and would be counter-productive. To be successful, the effort to discredit SB must come from within the affected communities. 